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Abstract
Al-Radd ‘ala ’l-Mant\iqiyyi>n (an alternative title for  Nas\i>h}at Ahl al-
I>ma>n) is a work composed by Ibn Taymiyya to demolish each principle of
logic as well as to unravel the depravity of their foundation. Probably due
to Ibn Taymiyya’s being genius, when he destroys those principles, he could
not avoid himself  to discuss digressively irrelevant topics dealing with
theological as well as metaphysical issues. In a number of passages in al-
Radd, he could not even hinder himself to make a good deal of repetitions.
Therefore, al-Radd ‘ala’l-Mant\iqiyyi>n is complex and difficult to use.
The coherence of  arguments that Ibn Taymiyya formulated is not solid and
comprehensive. His criticism of logic is not penetrating as well. On the
basis of  my analysis of  al-Suyu>t\i >’s method of  abridgement of  Ibn
Taymiyya’s al-Radd, I argue that al-Suyu>t\i> succeeded in rendering Ibn
Taymiyya’s sequence of  ideas superior to that found in the original work
of  the latter.  The result of  this study confirms Hallaq’s argument that
the overall result of  al-Suyu>t\i>’s abridgement of  Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd
is ‘a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated by Ibn
Taymiyya.
–––––––––––––––––
* I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. P. Sj. van Koningsveld who
read and corrected the draft of this paper.
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A. Introduction
A number of works composed by al-Suyu>t\i> to prohibit the study
of logic reveals not only his unfavourable legal attitude toward logic,
but also the fact that he is concerned with demolishing each principle
of logic as well as with unravelling the depravity of their foundation.
While his unfavourable attitude is reflected by his composition of S|awn
al-Mant\iq wa’l-Kala>m ‘an Fann al-Mant\iq wa’l-Kala>m1 and by his issuance
of  the Fatwa> against logic,2 his occupation for demolishing the principles
of Greek logic seems to be represented by the fact that he abridged
Ibn Taymiyya’s Nas\i>h}at Ahl al-I>ma>n fi> al-Radd ‘ala> Mant\iq al-Yu>na>n (an
alternative reading of  al-Radd ‘ala’l-Mant\iqiyyi>n, forthwith called: NAI).
Although his concern for demolishing logic is limited only by
rendering Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI into a concise treatise which is more
comprehensible, al-Suyu>t\i>’s merit should be acknowledged for a number
of  reason: First,  the study of  his abridgement, viz. Jahd al-Qari>h}a fi>
Tajri>d al-Nas\i>h}a (forthwith called: JQ), and the abridged work, viz. NAI,
tells us the fact that al-Suyu>t\i> has succeeded in presenting the arguments
of  Ibn Taymiyya to become more comprehensible. Secondly, al-Suyu>t\i>
can even be said to have rendered the sequence of  Ibn Taymiyya’s
arguments superior than that found in Ibn Taymiyya’s original work,
i.e. NAI.
This paper tries to answer following questions: (1) When was JQ
composed and what was the purpose of its composition? (2) How did
al-Suyu>t\i> abridge Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI (alternative reading of  al-Radd
–––––––––––––––––
1 In this work, al-Suyu>t\i> discusses the origin of logic, the history of its
introduction into the Muslim world as well as the scholars who made use of it in their
scientific enterprises. See, Ali, Mufti, ‘Jala>l al-Di>n al-Suyu>t\i> against Logic and Kala>m:
Analysis and Significance of  S|awn al-Mant\iq wa’l-Kala>m ‘an Fannay al-Mant\iq wa’l-Kala>m,’ in
Hamdard Islamicus (Karachi, Pakistan, 2005), vol. XXVIII, no. 2, p. 23-44.
2 In his fatwa> against logic, al-Suyu>t\i> prohibited people to study logic by referring
to a great number of leading Muslim jurists of various sunnite legal affiliations. This
fatwa> has been edited and can be found in his al-H{a>wi> li ’l-Fata>wi> (Cairo: Da>r al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyya, 1959), vol. I, p. 393.
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‘ala ’l-Mant\iqiyyi>n)? (3) In which way did he contribute to presenting
Ibn Taymiyya’s argument more comprehensible?
Apart from an introduction and a conclusion, this paper consists
of  five parts. The first part deals with the date and purpose of  al-
Suyu>t\i>’s abridgement of  Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI. The second part is
concerned with the contribution made by al-Suyu>t\i> in presenting Ibn
Taymiyya’s arguments more comprehensible. The third part discusses
elements of  Ibn Taymiyya’s religious viewpoints against logic in JQ.
The fourth part reviews the method used  by al-Suyu>t\i> when selecting
Ibn Taymiyya’s viewpoints against logic in the former’s abridgement.
The fifth part will be devoted to discuss the rationale of  al-Suyu>t\i>’s
selection of  Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments in JQ.
B. The Date and Purpose of  Abridgement of  Nas\i>h}a
JQ was composed in 888/1482. This was mentioned by al-Suyu>t\i>
in the introduction of S|awn al-Mant\iq, one of his work composed before
the composition of  JQ: “I related in it [viz. al-Qawl al-Mushriq fi> Tah}ri>m
al-Ishtiga>l bi’l-Mant\iq]3 that the Shaykh al-Isla>m, one of  the scholars who
has reached the degree of  ijtiha>d, Taqiy al-Di>n b. Taymiyya composed
a book to undo its foundations, which I had not found at that time.
Twenty years had passed by without having found it. Then when this
year had come, and I had told of what God endowed upon me in
attaining the rank of independent legal investigation, someone
mentioned that one of the conditions for legal investigation was the
knowledge of the art of logic claiming that this condition was lacked
in me. The poor fellow did not understand that I knew it better than
those who claim to know it and who defend it. I know the principles
of its foundations, as well as the insights based thereon equally well as
the leading logicians of  today, with the exception of  only our very
learned teacher, Muh}yi> al-Di>n al-Ka>fi>ji> [d. 879/1475]. Thus I sought
–––––––––––––––––
3 Twenty years before having written JQ, al-Suyu>t\i> had composed al-Qawl al-
Mushriq in which he prohibits the study of logic by referring to more than fourty
prominent leading scholars who anathematized the study of logic. See my article, ‘al-
Suyu>t\i>’s Contribution to the Historiography of  the Muslim Opposition against Logic:
with Special Reference to al-Qawl al-Mushriq fi> Tah}ri>m al-Ishtiga>l bi ‘Ilm al-Mant\iq,’ in
Bibliotheca Orientalis (forthcoming).
282 Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008 M/1429 H
Mufti Ali
for Ibn Taymiyya’s book, till I found it. I saw that he had entitled it
Nas\i>h}at Ahl al-I>ma>n fi> al-Radd ‘ala> Mant\iq al-Yu>na>n. In it, he expressed
excellently his intention to undo its foundations one by one, while
explaining the depravity of  its principles. So I summarized it in a little
composition which I entitled Jahd al-Qari>h}a fi> Tajri>d al-Nas\i>h}a.”4
C. The Contribution Made by al-Suyu>t\i> in Presenting IT’s
Arguments more Comprehensible
JQ is an abridgement of  Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI. Al-Suyu>t\i> has
abridged NAI, which, according to Hallaq, approximately consists of
138,000 words, into one third of  it, viz. approximately 32,000 words.5
In summarizing this work, al-Suyu>t\i> did not try to reformulate Ibn
Taymiyya’s ideas or give comments on them. “In other words, his
abridgement is not paraphrastic: he simply let the logical parts intact
and deleted the greatest part of  metaphysical digressions.” However,
according to Hallaq, al-Suyu>t\i> can be said to have succeeded in pro-
viding a more readable NAI to the readers, and in making it a succinct
treatise.6 Besides, al-Suyu>t\i>’s omission of  Ibn Taymiyya’s metaphysi-
cal discussions in NAI and his cleansing a good deal of the repetitions
from the logical discussions, Hallaq argues, rendered “the sequence of
ideas” of JQ, “superior to that found in” NAI.7
In sum, Hallaq maintains that “the overall result of  al-Suyu>t\i>’s
abridgement is a more effective critique of logic than that originally
formulated by IT.8 This is in line with al-Suyu>t\i>’s own remark when he
concluded his work, JQ: “This is the end of what I have abridged from
Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise. I have conveyed his words verbatim, mostly
without any change. I have omitted much of his treatise, which consists
of  twenty fascicles. However, I have deleted nothing of  value; what I
did delete was not pertinent to the main argument. The deletions are
either digressions or replies to metaphysical and other queries, or
repetitions, or refutations of some logicians’ views that do not have
–––––––––––––––––
4 SM, p. 33-4.
5 JQ (Hallaq), p. liv-v.
6 ibid., p. lv.
7 ibid., p. liv.
8 ibid., p. liv.
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bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc. Those who read this
abridgement of mine will benefit more from it than they would should they take
up the original work, for the latter is complex and difficult to use.”9
D. Elements of IT’s Religious Viewpoints Against Logic and
Theology in JQ
Although most of the passages of this work are replete with his
concrete scientific criticism of each of the logical principles,10 there
are some passages that can be regarded as direct expressions of  IT’s
religious attitude toward logic, reflecting his censure, condemnation and
legal prohibition of the study of logic. The following passages will be
devoted to record IT’s viewpoints against logic in particular or against
the sciences of the ancients in general, such as philosophy inasfar as
they have been maintained in the abridged work of  al-Suyu>t\i>, viz. JQ.11
The first of these statements is very interesting, since it represents
a cultural attitude shared by many religious scholars towards the sciences
of  the ancients in general, and against logic in particular. The statement
says: fa inni> kuntu da>’iman a‘lamu anna’l-mant\iq al-yu>na>ni> la> yah}ta>ju ilayhi
’l-dhaki> wa la> yantafi‘u bihi ’l-bali>d (I have always known that Greek
logic is neither needed by the intelligent nor of any use to the dullard).12
IT’s oppositional attitude toward logic is also clearly indicated
in his harsh criticism of the philosophers who adopted the principles
of Aristotelian logic. Accordingly he remarks that “even the [pre-
Islamic] polytheistic Arabs possessed remnants of the religion of
Abraham and were thus better than the polytheistic philosophers who
–––––––––––––––––
9 For this translation, I rely fully on Hallaq’s translation of  JQ. See, JQ (Hallaq)
p. 174.
10 IT’s epistemological criticism of  logic is reflected in his aim to deconstruct
four main theses the logicians upheld: (1) al-tas\awwur la> yuna>lu illa> bi’l-h}add (no concept
can be formed except by means of definition), (2) al-h}add mufi>d tas\awwur al-ashya>’
(definition leads to the conception of  things), (3) al-tas\di>q la> yuna>lu illa> bi ’l-qiya>s (the
judgment cannot be formed except by means of analogy), and (4) al-burha>n yufi>d al-‘ilm
bi ’l-tas\di>qa>t (syllogism leads to the certain knoweldge of  judgements). The translation
of  these logical concepts are quoted from JQ (Hallaq), p. 3-174.
11 In discussing these, I fully rely on Hallaq’s translation of  JQ.
12 JQ (Hallaq), p. 3.
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adopted the principles propounded by Aristotle and his likes.”13
IT’s opposition against logic can be seen in his words in favour
of  al-Si>ra>fi>’s position maintaining that Arabic is the most noble language:
“When Matta> complimented logic and claimed that intelligent people
need it, Abu> Sa‘i>d responded that there is no need for it, and that the
need is rather for learning the Arabic language; for meanings are
instinctive and intellective, and in need of no special convention, while
Arabic is needed in order to understand meanings that must be learned.
That is why learning the Arabic language – upon which the
understanding of the Quran and the traditions depends – is, unlike
logic, a religious obligation whenever such obligation can be fulfilled
by the individual Muslim.”14
Ibn Taymiyya can also be said to have pronounced as his legal
opinion that the study of logic should be prohibited. This can be seen
in his following words: “The argument of the more recent scholars
that the study of logic is a religious obligation incumbent upon those
who are able to undertake it, and that it is one of the conditions which
must be met in order to interpret the Law, is indicative of  both their
ignorance of the Law and the uselessness of logic.”15
IT’s opposition against logic is also reflected in his condemnation
of  the society among which logic was founded, i.e. the Greeks.
According to IT, “the Greeks were polytheists and worshippers of  stars
and idols, much worse than the Jews and Christians even after the
latter had abrogated and distorted their own Scripture.”16
According to IT, “Muslim thinkers continue to denounce the
logicians’ method and expose its weaknesses, errors, intellectual
inadequacy, and inarticulateness. They have shown that such a method
is more likely to corrupt the rational and linguistic faculties than to set
them straight. They are not willing to adopt it in their own reasoning
or in their scholarly disputations, whether these disputations are
conducted against a friend or a foe.”17
–––––––––––––––––
13 ibid., p. 68.
14 ibid., p. 100.
15 ibid.
16 ibid., p. 103.
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In another passage, IT identifies the logicians with those whose
knowledge is limited and with those who have no capacity in
formulating concepts and clear expressions. This can be read in his
following remarks: “The stronger the intellectual faculty and its
conception are, the richer its expression becomes. But if  the intellect
and its expressions and concepts are feeble, the person possessing that
intellect will be as if he were the prisoner of his own mind and tongue.
Such is the case with the Greek logicians: you find them to be the
most limited in knowledge and learning, the weakest in formulating
concepts and clear expressions. This is why intelligent people who follow
the path of the logicians when treating of the sciences employ methods
that are prolix, compressed, affected, and arbitrary. All they do is to
explain the obvious and clarify the intelligible. This may lead them to
fall into all kinds of sophistry from which God has saved those who
do not follow their path.”18
His hostile attitude towards logic is also reflected in his dealing
with an authority to whom IT himself referred explicitly as the first
who mixed logic “with Islamic principles (bi us\u>l al-muslimi>n),”19 i.e. al-
Gaza>li>. This is clearly indicated in IT’s words saying that “those who
introduced this [essential definition] are the ones who wrote on the
principles of religion and law after Abu> H{a>mid [al-Gaza>li>] - towards
the end of the fifth century - and it is they who have discoursed on
definitions according to the doctrine of  the Greek logicians. Scholars
of all other denominations - the Ash’ari>s, Mu‘tazili>s, Karra>mi>s, Shi>‘i>s,
and others - hold that the function of definition is to distinguish
between the definiendum and other things. This is well known in the
writings of Abu ’l-H{asan al-Ash‘ari>, al-Qa>d}i> Abu> Bakr [al-Ba>qilla>ni>],
Abu> Ish}a>q [al-Isfara>yini>], Ibn Fu>rak, al-Qa>d}i> Abu> Ya‘la>, Ibn ‘Aqi>l, Ima>m
al-H{aramayn, Nasafi>, Abu> ‘Ali> [al-Jubba>’i>], Abu> Ha>shim [al-Jubba>’i>],
‘Abd al-Jabba>r, al- u>si>, Muh}ammad b. al-Hays\am, and others.”20
Accordingly, it is also reflected in his reference to al-Ghaza>li> as the
one who was responsible for spreading the logicians’ method through
–––––––––––––––––
17 ibid., p. 111.
18 ibid., p. 87; NAI (al-Radd), 166-7.
19 ibid., p. 154; NAI (al-Radd), p. 194-5..
20 ibid., p. 12-3.
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his works, including “in the beginning of his work al-Mustas\fa> an
introduction to Greek logic, and as the one who alleged that the learning
of  those who do not know this logic is not to be trusted.”21
His criticism of al-Ghaza>li> is also reflected in identifying the
latter as the proponent of a logical concept upheld by the logicians: al-
h}add mufi>d tas\awwur al-ashya>’ (definition leads to the conception of
things), a logical postulate which is opposed by, IT says, almost the
majority of Muslim theologians from among the Ash’arites, Mu‘tazilites,
Karamites and Shi’ites who oppose this postulate as can be seen in the
works of Abu’l-H{asan al-Ash‘ari>, Abu> Bakr al-Ba>qilla>ni>, Abu> Ish}a>q,
etc.22
Opposing this postulate and arguing against its proponent, IT
then puts forward a number of arguments maintaining that definition
does not lead to the conception of things: First, “a definition is merely
a statement and claim of  the definer. The statement ‘man’ is ‘a rational
animal’ is a declarative proposition (qad}iyya khabariyya) and a mere claim
devoid of  proof. Therefore the hearer may know the truthfulness of
this proposition before hearing it. This can be a proof that definition is
not needed when one acquires the knowledge.”23 Secondly, “if  the definer
is not able to prove the truthfullness of  the definition, the hearer fails
to know the defined thing. Therefore there is no need for definition.
Conceptualizing the thing defined with the definition is not possible
without the knowledge of  the truthfullness of  the saying of  the definer.
The truthfullness of  his saying is not known by a mere definition.
Thus, the defined thing cannot be known by the definition.”24 Thirdly,
“definition is not needed, because to form a concept necessitates the
examination of the validity of the definition. Consequently
apprehending the definiendum  should be preceded by apprehending
of  that which defines it.”25 Fourthly, “the use of  definition depends on
whether the hearer knows or not that the definiendum possesses the
attributes by means of which the logicians define the definiendum. If
–––––––––––––––––
21 ibid., p. 111-12.
22 ibid., p. 13.
23 ibid., p. 15.
24 ibid., p. 16.
25 ibid., p. 17.
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he does not know, he will not be able to form a concept of  it. If  he
does, he will form a concept of  it without definition. Therefore,
definition is not needed.”26
Fifthly, “seeking concepts necessitates awareness. Once the
intellect were aware of them, it would not seek them, thus they need
no definition. In short, it is awareness which is more useful than
definition when one seeks and enquires a concept, since the act of
seeking and enquiring presupposes awareness.”27 Sixthly, “their
understanding of the concept of definition is based on two invalid
principles:  First, a quiddity has a permanent reality, other than its own
existence, subsisting outside the mind. This argument is similar to the
one espoused by those who hold the non-existent to be a thing. Second,
the distinction between what is a necessary concomitant to quiddity
and what is essential to it. This principle has no truth in it. Understanding
this principle would be tantamount to saying ‘the existence together
with its necessary attributes’.”28 Seventhly, “in a complete definition,
the logicians require that a concept be formed of  all its essential
attributes common with other things. This means that all the attributes
must be included. That is impossible.”29 Eighthly, “requiring that
definition must include distinguishing specific differences (fus\u>l
mumayyiza) along with their distinction between what is essential and
what is accidental, is impossible.”30 Ninthly, “definition is impossible,
because its argument involves circularity: the apprehension of the
essence will depend on the apprehension of what the essential qualities
are, and the apprehension of the essential qualities will depend on
what the apprehension of  the essence is. Thus, if  the definiendum
cannot be known without definition, and definition is impossible, then
the definiendum cannot be known. This reflects the falsity of their
doctrine.”31 Tenthly, “the disagreement amongst them concerning
definition can not be resolved in terms of  [their] principles; and what
–––––––––––––––––
26 ibid., p. 18.
27 ibid., p. 22.
28 ibid., p. 23-4.
29 ibid., p. 27-8.
30 ibid., p. 28-9.
31 ibid., p. 29.
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entails the equalization of evidence (taka>fu’ al-adilla) [against and for
the truth] is invalid.”32
IT then asserts how al-Ghaza>li>’s introduction of  logic into Islamic
sciences led many scholars to follow the latter thinking that logic was
the only existing method. Furthermore, IT remarks that “little did these
thinkers know that intelligent and learned Muslims and others have
denounced and decried it. Muslim thinkers have written many works
about logic, and the majority of Muslims denounce it categorically
because of  what they have observed of  its [damaging] effects and
attendant consequences, which show the logicians views to be contrary
to sound knowledge and faith, views that led them to all sorts of
ignorance, heresy, and error.”33
IT, however, argues that al-Ghaza>li>, as reflected in the books he
wrote towards the end of his life, changed his views and maintained
that the logicians’ method is false and leads to uncertainty. According
to al-Ghaza>li>, IT says, logic led the former nowhere, “and has removed
none of  the doubt and perplexity which possessed him. To him logic
was to no avail.”34
Another typical remark by IT that can be regarded as having
served religious ground for the opposition against logic is found in his
following words: “What Muslim thinkers have shown in their
discussions of  the Greek logic attributed to Aristotle is that the forms
of the syllogism and the subject-matter that the logicians have
elaborated with great efforts are of no use in the acquisition  of
knowledge.”35
Furthermore, he remarks “Muslim thinkers have held that logic
does not lead to the knowledge sought after, and may constitute an
obstacle in the way of attaining that knowledge because logic is tedious
for the mind.”36
In another passage, IT remarks that “Muslim scholars continue
to write in refutation of the philosophers’ logic, and to expose the
–––––––––––––––––
32 ibid., p. 30.
33 ibid., p. 112.
34 ibid.
35 ibid., p. 132.
36 ibid.
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errors in their discourse concerning both definition and syllogism. They
also continue to expose the philosophers’ errors in metaphysics and
other matters. No Muslim scholar has attached importance to their
method; in fact, the Ash’ari>s, Mu’tazili >s, Karra>mis, Shi>’i >s, and
speculative thinkers in other groups have condemned their method
and exposed its falsehood. Muslim scholars have since discussed logic
at too great a length to be mentioned here. The refutation of the
logicians is set forth in many a theological work. In Abu> Muh}ammad
al-H{asan b. Mu>sa> al-Nawbakhti>’s work al-A<ra>’ wa ’l-Diya>na>t there is a
useful chapter (fas\l) of such refutation.”37
In condemning logic, IT also refers to Ibn al-Qushayri>’s hostile verses
condemning Ibn Sina>’s al-Shifa>’:
“We severed the ties of  brotherhood with those stricken
By the malady of the book of al-Shifa>’
How often have I said to them
You are about to be swept away by the book of  al-Shifa>’
When they made little of our warning
We turned to God and He was sufficient
They then died while following the religion of Aristotle
And we lived according to the Religion of the Chosen.”38
In opposing logic, IT also reports the event which occurred when
al-T|u>naji>39 was dying. According to IT, “those who were present at the
deathbed of T|u>naji>, the chief logician of his time, reported that just
before his death he said: ‘I die knowing nothing except that the possible
presupposes the necessary.’ He then added: ‘And presupposition is a
negative attribute, so I die knowing nothing.’40
In another passage, IT even condemns explicitly Ibn Si>na>, the
fervent follower of  Aristotle. This can be clearly read in his words:
“What is meant here is that Ibn Si>na> said in his autobiography that his
family, his father, and his brother were heretics whom he used to hear
–––––––––––––––––
37 ibid., p. 153-4.
38 ibid., p. 173.
39 According to Hallaq, Afd}al al-Di>n ‘Ali> Muh}ammad b. Na>ma>war ‘Abd al-Malik
al-T|u>na>ji> (d. 646/1249) was “a logician who belonged to the Sha>fi‘i> legal school.” ibid.,
p. 42, n. 57 1.
40 ibid., p. 132-3.
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discuss the intellect and the soul, and because of this he occupied
himself  with the study of  philosophy. Nonetheless, despite the obvious
heresy and inner disbelief of those Muslims with whom he is affiliated,
their belief in God is greater than that of the ancient philosophers,
such as Aristotle and his followers, whose knowledge of God is
surpassed even by the [pre-Islamic] polytheistic Arabs.”41
In the same line, IT’s hostile attitude toward philosophers is
clearly indicated in his remarks “Therefore the goal of the philosophers
- if God leads them into some guidance – is the start of the Jews and
infidel Christians, not to speak of the Muslims, the followers of the
Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace -  (wa liha>dha> ka>nat
niha>yat al-fala>sifa – idha> hada>hum alla>h ba‘d} al-hida>ya – bida>yat al-yahu>d
wa ’l-nas\a>ra al-kuffa>r, fad}lan ‘an al-muslimi>n ummati muh}ammad s\alla ’lla>h
‘alayh wa sallam)”42
In the same line, IT’s censure of  the philosophers can also be
clearly read in his words: “Thus, the views of those philosophers
became widespread among people lacking in reason and religion, such
as the Karmatians and the Ba>t\ini>s, whose doctrinne combines the
philosophy of the Greeks with the religion of the Magians, although
outwardly they adhere to the religion of Rafd}. Of the same stock are
the ignorant mystics and speculative theologians. Being heretics and
hypocrites, they find fertile ground in an ignorant (ja>hiliyya) environment
which is far from knowledge and faith. They also find wide acceptance
among hypocritical heretics as well as among the polytheistic Turks.
They always find acceptance among the heretical and hypocritical
enemies of  God and of  His Messenger.”43
In concluding his discussion against logic, IT fervently attacks
the philosophers (the logicians) revealing the falsity of their logic. This
is clearly read in his words which read: “From the foregoing it has
become clear that restricting the methods for the acquisition of
knowledge to those which they have stipulated in logic is false, both in
content and form. It has also become clear that they have excluded
–––––––––––––––––
41 ibid., p. 64.
42 NAI (al-Radd), p. 133.
43 JQ (Hallaq), p. 104.
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from the valid sciences those which are more sublime, more imposing,
and more numerous than those they have subscribed to, and that the
methods they have prescribed lead to only a few contemptible sciences
that are neither noble nor numerous. Such is the level of  these people
– in their knowledge and practice they are the lowest of  all humans. In
many ways, the heretical Jews and Christians are more noble in their
knowledge and practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even
elevate its follower to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Christians
after the latter have abrogated and distorted [their own Books], let
alone prior to their doing so.”44
E. How did al-Suyu>t\i> Select IT’s Viewpoints against Logic in
this Abridgement?
Hallaq is right that when abridging NAI, al-Suyu>t\i> has left the
logical parts intact and deleted the metaphysical digressions in IT’s
discussion.45 Having compared JQ and NAI, it appears that the repetitive
arguments of IT and his digressive discussion on metaphysical issues
that had been deleted in JQ, however, contain relevant elements of
IT’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic, the logicians, the
philosophers, Aristotle, the Mutakallimu>n, etc. The following are some
typical examples.
To begin with, IT, for instance, says that “those who deal with
definition (al-h}udu>d) after al-Ghaza>li> are those who deal with them
following the Greek logical method.”46
IT’s censure of  the Mutakallimu>n can be read for instance in his
remarks that some groups of the Mutakallimu>n argue against the falsity
of  the arguments of  the philosophers with false and invalid arguments.47
Accordingly, he also condemned the Mutakallimu>n for their arguing
with the philosophers in a number of questions such as the novelty of
the Universe (h}udu>th al-‘a>lam), the attestation of the existence of the
–––––––––––––––––
44 ibid., p. 172-3.
45 ibid., p. liv-v.
46 NAI (al-Radd), p. 15.
47 ibid., p. 105.
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Creator (ithba>t al-s\a>ni‘), and prophecies (al-nubuwwa>t), with the use of a
false method which is deviating from the Divine law (al-shar‘) as well
as from reason (al-‘aql).48
IT’s censure against both the Mutakallimu>n and the philosophers
is clearly indicated when he speaks of “the mistake which the
philosophers committed when dealing with metaphysical questions,
prophecies, the hereafter and divine laws,” which, according to IT,
was “graver than that of the Mutakallimu>n. As for what they opine
concerning physical and mathematical sciences is that the soundness
of the philosophers is more often than those among the Mutakallimu>n
who argue against them. Most of the opinions of the Mutakallimu>n
concerning these issues are not based on knowledge, reason, and divine
rule.” (wa ’l-khat\a’ fi>ma> taqawwalah al-mutafalsifa fi ’l-ila>hiyya>t wa ’l-
nubuwwa>t wa ’l-ma‘a>d, wa ’l-shara>’i‘ a‘z}am min khat\a’ al-mutakallimi>n. Wa
amma> fi>ma> yaqu>lu>nah fi ’l-‘ulu>m al-t\abi>‘iyya wa ’l-riya>d}iyya faqad yaku>n s\awa>b
al-mutafalsifa akthara min s\awa>b man radda ‘alayhim min ahl al-kala>m fa
inna akthara kala>m ahl al-kala>m fi> ha>dhih al-umu>r bila> ‘ilm wa la> ‘aql wa la>
shar‘).49
In another passage, IT identifies the philosophers with the ones
who are the most ignorant of God, the Lord of the Universe,50 and
with those whose belief are similar to that of the hypocrites who adhere
to the Islamic tenet only superficially refusing inwardly what has been
prescribed by the Prophets.51 IT then shows their error in refusing the
knowledge of  God and His Attributes.52
Referring to al-Ghaza>li>, IT also anathematizes the concepts of
the philosophers dealing with the fact that God does not know the
particulars, with the sempiternality of the Universe and with the
rejection of the hereafter (inka>r al-ma‘a>d).53
As for typical characteristics of  IT’s digressions can be repre-
sented in a number of  following cases.
–––––––––––––––––
48 ibid., p. 105.
49 ibid., p. 311.
50 ibid., p. 394.
51 ibid., p. 459.
52 ibid., p. 462.
53 ibid., p. 523.
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1. Case 1
(1a) When dealing with a subjectmatter, IT usually treats it in
details. When he discusses definition (al-h}add) and syllogism (al-qiya>s)
by which a concept and judgement are respectively formed, he explains
the definition of al-h}add and its being identified with its species: al-
h}aqi>qi>, al-rasmi> and al-lafz}i> and that of al-qiya>s and its being identified
with its species: al-jadali>, al-shi‘ri>, al-sufast\a>’i>. IT then deals with each
of those species of al-h}add and al-qiya>s, the discussion of which occupies
more than two printed pages of NAI.54
However, IT’s viewpoints in this issue, that al-Suyu>t\i> abridges
in JQ, are very concise. This can be obviously read in his abridgement:
“You ought to know that they have founded logic upon the theory of
definition and its species, and upon demonstrative syllogism and its
species. They have held that, inasmuch as knowledge is either a concept
(tas\awwur) or a judgement (tas\di>q), the means by which a concept is
formed is a definition, and that by which a judgement is formed is a
syllogism. To this we say that the discussion revolves around four points,
two negative and two affirmative. The first of  the two [negative points]
concerns their doctrine that no required concept can be formed except
through a definition; and the second of the two that no required
judgement can be known except by means of a syllogism. The other
two [affirmative points] concern their doctrine that [1] definition leads
to the knowledge of concepts, and [2] the prescribed syllogism or
demonstration leads to the knowledge of  judgements.”55
It is clear that when al-Suyu>t \i > encountered IT’s lengthy
discussions of a subjectmatter, he dealt only with the most essential
passages avoiding the details thereof.
(1b)This also holds true for IT’s lengthy discussion of  the fact
that definition can be challenged by means of refutation (naqd}) and by
introducing another, opposing definition (mu‘a>rad}a), the explanation
of both of which occupies a couple of pages in NAI.56 Al-Suyu>t\i>,
however, abridges it to become one paragraph: “Tenth, they argue that
–––––––––––––––––
54 ibid., p. 4-7.
55 JQ (Hallaq), p. 5-6.
56 NAI (al-Radd), p. 11-3.
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the opponent is entitled to challenge definition by means of refutation
(naqd}) –through Coextensiveness (t\ard) and Coexclusiveness (‘aks)– as
well as by introducing another, opposing definition (mu‘a>rad}a). If the
hearer can invalidate the definition at times by Refutation and at others
by Opposition, and since neither is possible without first forming a
concept of the definiendum, then it becomes clear that the concept of
the definiendum can be formed without definition. And this is what
we sought to prove.”57
(1c) The same pattern applies to IT’s argument against a postulate
that “definition leads to the conception of  things.” According to IT,
this postulate is not only upheld by many scholars, among whom al-
Ghaza>li>, but also opposed by many opponents, among whom are Abu
’l-H{asan al-Ash‘ari>, al-Qa>d}i> Abu> Bakr [al-Ba>qilla>ni>], Abu> Ish}a>q [al-
Isfara>‘ini>], Ibn Fu>rak, al-Qa>d}i> Abu> Ya‘la>, Ibn ‘Aqi>l, Ima>m al-H{aramayn,
Nasafi>, Abu> ‘Ali> [al-Jubba>’i>], Abu> Ha>shim [al-Jubba>’i>], ‘Abd al-Jabba>r,
al- u>si>, Muh}ammad b. al-Hays\am, etc. Furthermore, IT deals with
the viewpoints of  these prominent scholars on this issue, which
occupies seven printed pages of  NAI.58 Finally, he comes up with his
refutation against al-Gaza>li>’s viewpoints on this issue, for which purpose
he devotes more than four printed pages of NAI.59On this issue, al-
Suyu>t\i> as reflected in his JQ dealt with it only in two paragraphs covering
eleven printed-pages.60
There are many passages which can be regarded here to have
followed this typical example: par. 22,61 23,62 29,63 30,64 33,65 34,66 etc.
–––––––––––––––––
57 JQ (Hallaq), p. 10-11.
58 NAI (al-Radd), p. 16-22.
59 ibid., p.22-7.
60 JQ (Hallaq), p. 12.
61 ibid., p. 15-6; NAI (al-Radd), p.32-3.
62 ibid., p. 16; NAI (al-Radd), p.33-7.
63 Al-Suyu>t\i> in this passage records only IT’s indication that al-Gaza>li>, Ibn Si>na>,
al-Ra>zi>, al-Suhrawardi> and others admitted “that definitions (h}udu>d) and names (asma>’)
have the same defining functions,” without dealing with their individual viewpoints
on this issue. JQ (Hallaq), p. 20-1; NAI (al-Radd), p.40-49.
64 In this regard, al-Suyu>t\i> avoids to deal with detailed IT’s discussion that the
knowledge of  definitions (h}udu>d) is derived from Religion. Accordingly he also left IT’s
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2. Case 2
Al-Suyu>t\i>, as suggested by Hallaq, can be said to have altered
the text of NAI. This is typically represented in the fact that al-Suyu>t\i>,
Hallaq argues, “speaks of  the four eponyms representing the surviving
legal schools, whereas IT in al-Radd [NAI] does not limit them to four,
but speaks of madha>hib in a general sense, including the madha>hib of
lesser mujtahidu>n. Thus, in addition to Abu> H{ani>fa (d. 150/767), Ma>lik
b. Anas (d. 179/795), al-Sha>fi‘i> (d. 204/820), and Ibn H{anbal (d. 241/
855), he mentions Ish}a>q b. Ra>hawayhi (d. 238/852), al-Layth b. Sa‘d
(d. 157/773), al-Awza>‘i> (d. 158/774), and Da>wud b. ‘Ali> al- a>hiri> (d.
270/884).”67
3. Case 3
In this case, without giving a reason, al-Suyu>t\i> can be said to
have omitted lengthy passages of NAI. This is clearly indicated in the
following example: When arguing for the fact that “a syllogism must
include a universal premiss; but the universality of the proposition
cannot be known unless it be ascertained that all the particulars under
that universal share one common factor, and this is done by means of
analogy,” IT proposes fourteen considerations, the ninth of  which is
omitted altogether by al-Suyu>t\i> in his JQ.68 This omitted passage (NAI,
p. 396-437), however, records IT’s lengthy discussion “against the
logicians who maintained that widespread (mashhu>ra>t), and to a lesser
extent estimative (wahmiyya>t), propositions do not lead to certain
knowledge,” and his references to the viewpoints of  Ibn Si>na> and al-
Ra>zi> on this issue.69
–––––––––––––––––
linguistic discussion of al-h}udu>d al-lafz}iyya in relation with their legal and theological as
well as exegesis significance.JQ (Hallaq), p. 21-2; NAI (al-Radd), p.49-61.
65 JQ (Hallaq), p. 24-5; NAI (al-Radd), p. 64-6.
66 ibid., p. 25; NAI (al-Radd), p.66-9.
67 ibid., p. 169, n. 310 (1); NAI (al-Radd), p.443-5.
68 ibid., p. 142-172; NAI (al-Radd), p.299-472.
69 ibid., p. 167.
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4. Case 4
Al-Suyu>t\i> has deleted IT’s metaphysical digressions. This is clearly
indicated by the fact that al-Suyu>t\i> omitted 27 printed pages of NAI
(p. 474-500) in which IT deals with a number of  following metaphysical
topics: the celestial soul’s (nafs falakiyya) knowledge of  earthly events
(al-h}awa>dith fi ’l-ard}), the falsity of  claim that a Sufi> could be informed
about the content of  al-lawh} al-mah}fu>z} (the Well-Preserved Tablet),
intiqa>sh al-‘ilm fi ’l-h}iss al-mushtarik (extracting knowledge of  the celestial
soul by the common perception of earthly beings, vision (ru’ya), the
Prophet’s knowledge of  the events of  the past and the future, the
difference between the angel and the genie and between philosophical
analogy and mystical fantasy, etc.70
This also holds true for the last 44 pages of  NAI, in which IT
deals with following questions: the acquisition of the knowledge of
the angels and the genie by the Prophets by means of their souls,71 the
perplexity of the astronomers on ka’ba,72 Divine and evil inspiration,73
the refutation of the view that the knowledge of the unseen (al-ghayb)
is not obtained through the intermediary of  the Prophets,74 the
difference of the theologians’ methods and those of the philosophers
(the logicians) in the acquisition of the knowledge,75 reprehensible and
praiseworthy perdition (al-fana>’ al-madhmu>m wa’l-fana>’ al-mah}mu>d),76 the
anathemized concepts of the philosophers on the sempiternality of
the Universe, the refutation of  God’s knowledge of  the particulars
and of the hereafter,77 etc.
In response to these questions, al-Suyu>t\i> has made IT to deal
with them only in two paragraphs (par. 319 and 320 of  JQ) 78 the first
of which reads: “From the foregoing it has become clear that restricting
–––––––––––––––––
70 ibid., p. 172; NAI (al-Radd), p.473-500.
71 NAI (al-Radd), p. 501-2, 505-9,
72 ibid., p. 502-5.
73 ibid., p. 507-9.
74 ibid., p. 509-511.
75 ibid., p. 511-523.
76 ibid., p. 516-8.
77 ibid., p. 523.
78 JQ (Hallaq), p. 173-4; NAI (al-Radd), p.500-545.
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the methods for the acquisition of knowledge to those which they
have stipulated in logic is false, both in content and form. It has also
become clear that they have excluded from the valid sciences those
which are more sublime, more imposing, and more numerous than those
they have subscribed to, and that the methods they have prescribed
lead to only a few contemptible sciences that are neither noble nor
numerous. Such is the level of  these people- in their knowledge and
practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even elevate its follower
to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Christians after the latter
have abrogated and distorted [their own Books], let alone prior to their
doing so…”79 While paragraph 320 reads: “Someone may argue: ‘Some
of the logicians’ views with regard to confining the methods of acquiring
knowledge [to what they have prescribed] are found in the discourse
of  Muslim theologians. Some of  the latter even espouse it verbatim or
with changes in terminology.’ We answer: not all the doctrines of  the
speculative theologians are true. However, all that which the
messengers have brought down is true. Whatever in the views of  the
speculative theologians and others corresponds to what the messengers
have brought down is true; whatever does not conform is false. The
forefathers’ and the leading scholars’ condemnation of the heretically
innovative speculative theologians is well known.”80
Al-Suyu>t\i> also deleted IT’s lengthy discussion of  a number of
other questions: the polytheism of Aristotle and the Greeks,81 the roots
of polytheism,82 the belief of the Sabi’ites in H{arra>n,83 the conversion
of the residents of H{arra>n to Christianity through the role of
Constantine,84 the fact that all the prophets are Muslim,85 remarks on
the statement of  Abraham: “this is my Lord (ha>dha> rabbi>),”86 the
–––––––––––––––––
79 ibid., p. 172-3.
80 ibid., p. 173.
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philosophers’ views that the souls are essentialy identical,87 the
attestation of the prophethood (ithba>t al-nubuwwa),88 the acquisition of
knowledge by the soul after its being free from the body during sleep,89
the philosophers’ attestation of the prophethood,90 the philosophers’
view that the sainthood is more noble than prophethood,91 the arrival
of  the angel in form of  humanbeing,92 the philosophers’ interpretation
of the angel and the revelation,93 the task of the angels,94 etc.
F. The Rationale of al-Suyu>t\i>’s Selection of IT’s Arguments in
JQ
What is the rationale of  al-Suyu>t\i>’s selection of  arguments in
JQ?; Why did he in his JQ record some of  IT’s arguments and delete
the others?
Al-Suyu>t\i> stated that IT’s arguments that he has deleted in JQ
are in form of  “digressions or replies to metaphysical and other que-
ries, or repetitions, or refutations of some logicians’ views that do not
have bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc.” He then added
that what he “deleted was nothing of value” and “was not pertinent to
the main argument.”95
There are, however, other cases that cast a different light on the
process of  abridgement. To begin with, al-Suyu>t\i> can be said to have
purposely limited IT’s frequent references to al-Ghaza>li>. This is clearly
reflected in the fact that NAI records more than 28 references by IT to










95 JQ (Hallaq), p. 174.
96 See al-Radd (ed. Dr. Rafi>q al-‘Ajm, Beirut: Da>r al-Fikr al-Lubna>ni>, 1993) vol. I,
p. 33, 42, 46, 49, 57, 64, 70, 93, 129, 130, 144, 150, 196, 199 ; vol.II,  p. 34, 35, 37, 83, 84,
108, 115, 117, 184, 200, 207, 232, 243, 244.
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records only six references to him.97 This remarkable phenomenon may
be closely related to al-Suyu>t\i>’s earlier assertion, as recorded in his
QM, that al-Ghaza>li> has changed his view in favour of logic and become
one of  its fervent opponents. This can also be clearly read in the other
works we are discussing in this study: i.e. SM and the Fatwa>.
Having read the fact that some of  IT’s arguments which al-Suyu>t\i>
deleted in JQ are dealing with theological questions such as the At-
tributes of God,98 His Oneneness (al-tawh}i>d),99 visio beatifica (al-ru’ya),100
etc, it appears that al-Suyu>t\i> has made IT’s NAI to deal exclusively
with concrete scientific criticism of logical principles and with the
latter’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic. It is thus clear that
when abridging IT’s NAI, al-Suyu>t\i> can be said to have avoided pur-
posely to record IT’s discussion of  theological matters. Here, atten-
tion may be drawn to the fact that al-Suyu>t\i> provided a separate work
later, i.e. SM, in which he extensively dealt with theological problems
and their relation to logical ones, as will be discussed in chapter three.
It is true that JQ records IT’s references to the theologians in
more than twenty four times, IT’s reference to them in JQ, however,
only deals with his censure of them and does not discuss their theo-
logical views as such.101
This also holds true for the fact that al-Suyu>t\i> has deleted IT’s
discussion of questions dealing with fiqh and its us\u>l such as question
of qibla (direction to which Muslims turn in praying),102 and that of
ta‘li>l al-h}ukm.103
–––––––––––––––––
97 Actually in JQ al-Gaza>li> is referred to more than nine times, 6 of which was
referred to by al-Suyu>t\i> as one who upheld the principle of the logicians. Four references
to al-Gaza>li> are made by al-Suyu>t\i> as one who “wrote treatises and tracts in refutation of
sectarian and other groups” and as one who maintained “that the sciences of the
philosophers are either truthful but futile or false suppositions that are not to be
trusted,” as well as one who withdrewn himself from being occupied with logic, since
it leads him to uncertainty. See, (index of) JQ (Hallaq), p. 12, 20, 46, 48, 111, 154.
98 NAI (al-Radd), p.225-233, 241.
99 ibid., p.214-224.
100 ibid., p.238-241.
101 JQ (Hallaq), p. 8, 12, 14, 15, 33, 46, 50, 51, 51, 53, 62, 66, 70, 79, 86, 99, 104,
112, 131, 148, 153, 154, 169, 172, 173.
102 NAI (al-Radd), p.260.
103 ibid., p.236-8.
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In sum, the rationale of  al-Suyu>t \i >’s selection of  certains
arguments proposed by IT in NAI might be closely associated with al-
Suyu>t\i>’s purpose to make JQ to contain only IT’s concrete scientific
criticism of  logical principles and not IT’s theologico-legal as well as
metaphysical discussions, since theologico-legal discussions were to
be dealt with by al-Suyu>t\i> himself in a work composed  later (i.e. SM).
However, a question should be raised here whether or not al-
Suyu>t\i>’s attempt at selecting from Ibn Taymiyya only the utterance
related to logic not those related to theological-legal as well as
metaphysical discussion is closely associated with his objective of
abridging NAI, i.e. to show off his being well-versed in logic, his being
familiar with its principles and his competency in differentiating
theological and methaphysical subjecmatters from those of purely
logical, to those who quentioned his competency in logic as one of the
conditions to undertake ijtiha>d. To the best of  my knowledge, there is
no historical evidence that could give negative answer, for an obvious
reason, i.e., the background of composing this work was to strengthen
al-Suyu>t\i>’s own claim for ijtiha>d and tajdi>d.
G. Conclusion
Al-Suyu>t\i >’s method in abridging Ibn Taymiyya’s Nas\i>h}at is
represented by the following facts: He left out IT’s digressive discussion
and repetitive arguments. Besides he did not record IT’s discussion of
theological and metaphysical issues.
Al-Suyu>t\i> can be said to have succeeded in presenting IT’s
arguments more comprehensible. He has even rendered the sequence
of  IT’s ideas superior than that recorded in the latter’s original work.
Therefore, his words claiming that “those who read this abridgement
of  mine will benefit more from it [viz. Jahd al-Qari>ha] than they should
take up the original work, for the latter is complex and difficult to
use,” 104 are not an exaggeration.
–––––––––––––––––
104 For this translation, I rely fully on Hallaq’s translation of  JQ. See, JQ (Hallaq)
p. 174.
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